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Abstract
We construct a static general equilibrium model with social common cap-
ital or highway-type congested public capital. Non-tradable goods are 
also introduced into this small open economy. We obtain the effects of an 
improvement in the terms of trade, as well as an operation in congestion 
tax, on the degree of congestion and social welfare. We also find that the 
non-tradable goods become crucial to the results of comparative statics 
when they are used as the numeraire.
Introduction
When considering social common (overhead) capital or public goods of a 
kind being employed as a factor of production, there are usually three types 
of formulations, as summarized by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992): (i) rival 
and excludable public goods; (ii) non-rival and non-excludable public goods; 
and (iii) rival and non-excludable public goods.
 The first type formulates a class of social common capital, such as a social 
security system, that may indeed be private goods but owned publicly and 
allocated to each user by, for example, the government instead of by certain 
invisible market mechanisms. The second type, e.g., Barro (1990), formu-
lates Samuelson’s (1954) pure public goods, such as free radio broadcasting, 
which provides each user the same amount of service, without being affected 
by the intensity of economic activities. The third type, e.g., Futagami and 
Mino (1995), Rioja (1999), and Fisher and Turnovsky (1998), formulates a 
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class of public goods subject to congestion, such as standard roads and air-
ports. In these models, the same amount of service derived from the public 
goods is enjoyed by all users or in an amount proportional to the user’s share 
of private capital. The congestion phenomenon is modelled by assuming that 
the quality of public goods is adversely affected by the intensity of economic 
activities, usually the aggregate stock of private capital.
 Although the three types of formulations cover a wide range of productive 
public goods, there is yet an important class of public goods—that of high-
way-type public capital including toll highways, water and sewer systems 
and postal systems—to which none of the three formulations can apply. First, 
these formulations assume that the service derived from the public goods is 
fixed or proportional to the private capital. However, users of highway-type 
public capital usually have a certain level of control over how much of the 
service to use. For example, drivers can determine by themselves how far and 
in which direction to travel. Second, also as a consequence of the first, the 
degree of congestion should be determined endogenously by users' optimal 
behavior, rather than being treated as an exogenous parameter. 
 Uzawa (1974) provides, to our knowledge, the first model that incorpo-
rates all the characterizations of highway-type public capital, and he called 
this class of public capital “social overhead capital.”4 That is, given the stock 
of public capital, more use of its services results in a greater degree of con-
gestion and lower productivity, and the use depends on both the relative 
price of factors of production and the degree of substitution between them. 
Uzawa’s model is a one-good model and focuses on the growth problem 
within a closed economy. Asako (2009) sets up a two-good model and uses it 
to study, above all, the effect of trade on the degree of congestion and social 
welfare, in order to obtain the optimal congestion tax. One of his results is 
that free trade does not necessarily improve social welfare with the presence 
of highway-type public capital.
 This paper introduces non-tradable goods into Asako’s model, to see what 
difference it will bring about. Changes in the terms of trade and congestion 
tax are considered: effects on the degree of congestion, the price of non-trad-
able goods, and social welfare are solved for. The optimum pattern for a 
congestion tax is provided as well. Finally, we identify the special role of the 
price numeraire in our model.
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1. The Model
1.1 Utility and Technology
Assume that three goods are produced. Good 1 and good 2 are tradable while 
good 3 is non-tradable.5 There are a large number of well-behaved house-
holds, whose average features are collectively integrated as the representative 
household. The utility of the representative household, which is deemed to 
be social welfare within the representative agent framework, is denoted by
U=U(C1,C2,C3, Xh;s),
where Ci(i=1,2,3) is the consumption on the i -th good;  Xh  is the amount 
of social common capital service used by the household; and  s  denotes 
the degree of congestion whose definition will be explained below. The util-
ity function is assumed to be: (i) strictly quasi-concave on (C1,C2,C3, Xh); 
(ii) strictly increasing in C1, C2, C3, Xh and decreasing in s; and (iii) twice 
continuously differentiable. To measure the sensitivity of the household over 
the degree of congestion, define by εh the elasticity of utility with respect to 
congestion 
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There are two production factors: the service of social common capital, and that of 
private capital. Private capital is simply capital in the normal meaning with stock K . While 
social common capital is rather “special” in the sense that no user can exclusively possess total 
or partial stock of social common capital, each user can derive service from it. Note the total 
amount of service derived from social common capital, denoted by X , could be any amount and 
does not have to be correlated with its stock, denoted byV .
There are a large number of firms producing good i  with the same technology, so that 
firm i  is referred to as the representative firm of those firms. Firm i  has technology 
   ,,= iiiii KXFsgQ
where iQ  is the output;    0,1sgi  measures the firm-specific impact of congestion; 6
 iii KXF ,  measures the positive contribution of productive factors, i.e., iX  and iK  which 
are, respectively, the service of social common capital and private capital employed by firm i．  
The congestion part  ig  and the positive contribution part  iF  are assumed to be separable 
for analytical simplicity.  
Assume that  iii KXF , is: (i) strictly quasi-concave on  ii KX , ; (ii) first-order 
homogeneous on  ii KX , ; (iii) strictly increasing in iX  and iK ; and (iv) twice continuously 
differentiable. By the homogeneity, the output can be rewritten as 
    ,= iiiii KxfsgQ (1) 
where the intensive variable iii KXx /  is the ratio of social common capital to private capital 
and    ,1iiii xFxf  .
2.2  Impact of Congestion 
A natural way of defining the degree of congestion s  may as well be 
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The relation between  sgi  and s  is similar to that between vehicle speed and traffic density. 
In the literature on road congestion, e.g., Inman (1978) and Verhoef (1999), vehicle speed and 
traffic density are usually understood as being adversely related. Assume that  sgi is: (i) 
non-increasing; (ii) continuous; and (iii) piecewise continuously differentiable. Other possible 
properties of  sgi , such as increasing/decreasing marginal congestion or jam degree of 
congestion resulting in   0=ig , are left open in this paper.7 To measure the sensitivity of firm 
i  over the degree of congestion, define by i  the  elasticity of production damage with 
6 Smaller  sgi  implies greater damage on firm i  and vice versa.
7 See Edwards (1990) for some other types of congestion.
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and that of private capital. Private capital is simply capital in the normal 
meaning with stock  K. While social common capital is rather “special” in 
the sense that no user can exclusively possess total or partial stock of social 
common capital, each user can derive service from it. Note the total amount 
of service derived from social common capital, denoted by X, could be any 
amount and does not have to be correlated with its stock, denoted by V.
 There are a large number of firms producing good i with the same technol-
ogy, so that firm i is referred to as the representative firm of those firms. Firm 
i has technology
Qi= gi(s)Fi(Xi, Ki),
where Qi is the utput; gi(s)∈[0,1] measu es the firm-specific impact of con-
gestion;6 Fi(Xi,Ki) measures the positive contribution of productive factors, 
i.e., Xi and Ki which are, respectively, the service of social common capital 
and private capital employed by firm i.  The congestion part gi(·) and the 
positive contribution part Fi(·) are assumed to be separable for analytical 
simplicity. 
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 Assume that Fi(Xi, Ki) is: (i) strictly quasi-concave on (Xi, Ki); (ii) 
first-order homogeneous on (Xi, Ki); (iii) strictly increasing in Xi and Ki; and 
(iv) twice continuously differentiable. By the homogeneity, the output can be 
rewritten as
 Qi= gi(s) fi(xi)Ki, (1)
where the intensive variable xi≡ Xi/Ki is the ratio of social common capital to 
private capital and fi(xi) ≡ Fi(xi,1).
1.2  Impact of Congestion
A natural way of defining the degree of congestion  s  may as well be
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Note that there might be some values of s  with which or over a certain range where 
i  does not exist. However, because of the piecewise continuously differentiable assumption on  
 sgi , that should not hinder further analysis. At any rate, this problem can be treated as if there 
were no singular points, and all that is needed is some additional discussion on the singular 
points when faced with specific problems. According to the non-increasing assumption, 0i .
Firm i  is said to be more (or less) congestion sensitive with respect to firm j  when i j 
(or i j  ).
2.3  Market Failure 
The markets for goods and private capital are perfectly competitive. Denote the price of 
good i  by ip  and the interest rate (rental price for private capital) by r . The service of social 
common capital is charged at   for per unit use. This fee  , called congestion tax, is assumed 
to be levied by the government with literally no managing cost.  
The representative household, taking the prices of goods and social common capital 
service as given, maximizes the utility  sXCCCU h;,,, 321  under an income budget constraint. 
Similarly, each representative firm maximizes profit  iiii rKXQp  , taking output and factor 
prices as given. Then for the representative household, it follows that the optimality condition 
implies  
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i
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where ii CUU  /  is the marginal utility of consumption for each good i  and  is the 
Lagrangean multiplier attached to the budget constraint of the optimization problem. It is well 
known that   is interpreted as the shadow price of income and is equal to the marginal utility 
of income.8 Also for the representative firm i , we should have 
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for profit maximization, where   iii
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Market failure stems from the key assumption about how the decision of utilizing social 
common capital service is made. Namely, each economic agent takes no account of the influence 
of its own behavior on the degree of congestion since there are a large number of households and 
firms. Specifically, the representative household uses the service of social common capital in the 
following manner: 
,=

 h
U (5) 
where hh XUU  / denotes the marginal utility of services derived from social common 
8 We do not explicitly solve for as the mere knowlege that  >0 is sufficient to obtain the propositions of this paper. 
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analysis. At any rate, this problem can be treated as if there were no singular 
points, and all that is needed is some additional discussion on the singular 
points when faced with specific problems. According to the non-increasing 
assumption, εi≥ 0. Firm  i  is said to be more (or less) congestion sensitive 
with respect to firm  j  when εi> εj (or εi< εj).
1.3  Market Failure
The markets for goods and private capital are perfectly competitive. Denote 
the price of good  i  by  pi  and the interest rate (rental price for private capital) 
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by  r . The service of social common capital is charged at  θ  for per unit use. 
This fee  θ, called congestion tax, is assumed to be levied by the government 
with literally no managing cost. 
 The representative household, taking the prices of goods and social 
common capital service as given, maximizes the utility U(C1, C2, C3, Xh;s) 
under an income budget constraint. Similarly, each representative firm maxi-
mizes profit ( piQi‒ θXi‒ rKi), taking output and factor prices as given. Then 
for the representative household, it follows that the optimality condition 
implies 
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where Uh≡ ∂U/∂Xh d notes the marginal utility of services de ived from
social common capital. Similarly, representative firms determine how much 
social common capital service to use by the condition that
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capital. Similarly, representative firms determine how much social common capital service to 
use by the condition that 
    .== 'iii
i
i
ii fsgpX
Fsgp


 (6) 
Note that an external economy consideration hXs  /  is neglected in (5) as is the case iXs  /
neglected in (6). 
2.4  Market Equilibrium and Trade Balance 
Without loss of generality, assume that good 1 is imported and good 2  is exported. 
The government transfers all revenue to the household, then the market-clearing condition for 
goods and the introduction of trade require that we have  
,= 11 pEQC  (7) 
,= 22 EQC  (8) 
,= 33 QC (9) 
where E  denotes the export of good 2 and 12/ppp   denotes the relative price of exportable 
to importable or the terms of trade. We assume that the economy is a small open economy, 
implying that p  is determined exogenously to this country. The market-clearing condition for 
private capital and the definition of X  require, respectively, that  
.=,= 321321 hXXXXXKKKK  (10) 
Counting equations (1) to (10), the income constraint, the definition of intensive capital 
ratio variables  1,2,3=ixi , and terms of trade p , there are in total 24 equations. According to 
Warlas Law, the number of independent equations then is 23. Excluding the exogenous 
parameters K , V ,   and p , we have the list of endogenous variables iQ , iC , iK , iX , ix ,
hX , X , s , r ,  , E , ip  to determine, which add up to 24 variables. But, by setting the 
price numeraire, the number of variables is reduced to 23, which is equal to the number of 
equations. This is merely an informal, naive check of the solution.  
The characterizations of the solution depend to large extent on the properties of the 
congestion damage function  ig . Therefore, given a specific form of  ig , there may be 
unique equilibrium solution or multiple solutions, or even the case of no solution. 
3  Change in the Terms of Trade 
3.1  Effects on Congestion 
Let good 1 be the numeraire, i.e. 11 p  to mean pp =2  for given terms of trade p .  
Suppose there occurs a small change in p , denoted by dp , while congestion tax   remains 
unchanged, i.e. 0=d . Using (4) and (6), we obtain9
0,=ˆˆ 11 ws   (11) 
0,=ˆˆˆ 22 wsp   (12) 
9 Refer to Appendix A for the detailed analytical derivations.
 
(6)
Note that an external economy consideration ∂s/∂Xh is neglected in (5) as is 
the case ∂s/∂Xi is neglected in (6).
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1.4 Market Equilibrium and Trade Balance
Without loss of generality, assume that good  1  is imported and good  2  is 
exported. The government transfers all revenue to the household, then the 
market-clearing condition for goods and the introduction of trade require that 
we have 
 C1 = Q1 + pE, (7)
 C2 = Q2 – E, (8)
 C3 = Q3 , (9)
where  E  denotes the export of good 2 and  p ≡ p2/p1  denotes the relative 
price of exportable to importable or the terms of trade. We assume that the 
economy is a small open economy, implying that  p  is determined exoge-
nously to this country. The market-clearing condition for private capital and 
the definition of  X  require, respectively, that 
 K = K1 + K2 + K3 ,    X = X1 + X2 + X3 + Xh.  (10)
 Counting equations (1) to (10), the income constraint, the definition of 
intensive capital ratio variables  xi(i=1,2,3), and terms of trade  p , there are 
in total 24 equations. According to Walras’s Law, the number of independent 
equations then is 23. Excluding the exogenous parameters  K ,  V ,  θ and 
p, we have the list of endogenous variables  Qi , Ci , Ki , Xi , xi , Xh , X, s, r, 
λ, E, pi  to determine, which add up to 24 variables. But, by setting the price 
numeraire, the number of variables is reduced to 23, which is equal to the 
number of equations. This is merely an informal, naive check of the solution. 
 The characterizations of the solution depend to large extent on the prop-
erties of the congestion damage function  gi (·). Therefore, given a specific 
form of  gi (·), there may be unique equilibrium solution or multiple solu-
tions, or even the case of no solution.
2. Change in the Terms of Trade
2.1 Effects on Congestion
Let good  1  be the numeraire, i.e.  p1 ≡ 1  to mean  p2 = p  for given terms 
of trade  p.  Suppose there occurs a small change in  p , denoted by  dp, 
while congestion tax  θ  remains unchanged, i.e. dθ = 0. Using (4) and (6), 
we obtain9  
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 –ε1ŝ + β1ŵ = 0, (11)
 pˆ – ε2ŝ + β2ŵ = 0, (12)
 pˆ3 – ε3ŝ+ β3ŵ = 0, (13)
where a hat operator "ˆ" denotes a proportional change (e.g.  pˆ2 = dp2/p2) and 
the newly introduced variables  w ≡ θ/r  and  βi ≡ rKi /piQi are, respectively, 
the relative factor price ratio and income share of private capital in firm  i. 
Note that  ŵ = – rˆ   since  dθ = 0  here. 
 From (11) and (12), given that  ε1/β1 ≠ ε2 /β2, we can solve for  ŝ  and  ŵ  to 
obtain
 
6
0,=ˆˆˆ 333 wsp   (13) 
where a hat operator "^" denotes a proportional change (e.g. 222 /=ˆ pdpp ) and the newly 
introduced variables rw /  and iiii QprK / are, respectively, the relative factor price ratio 
and income share of private capital in firm i . Note that rw ˆ=ˆ   since 0=d  here.  
From (11) and (12), given that 2211 //   , we can solve for sˆ  and wˆ to obtain    
 
,ˆ1=ˆ
212
p
ee
s

(14) 
 
,ˆ=ˆ
212
1 p
ee
ew

(15) 
where iiie  /  can be called "congestion-relevance index" since large ie , whether caused by 
large i  or small i  (thus large income share of social common capital service), implies that 
firm i  is highly relevant or contributory to congestion. It follows from (14) that   
Proposition 1  Let import goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. An 
improvement in the terms of trade reduces the degree of congestion if and only if the export firm 
has a smaller congestion-relevance index than the import firm.10 That is:
2 1< 0 iff < .
ds e e
dp
Proposition 1 is intuitive and similar with the result of Asako (2009). Introducing 
non-tradable goods seems to make no difference here. Note that 0</dpdw if and only if 
12 < ee , and note also that it is possible for 12 < ee  when 12 > ,  where i  denotes the 
income share of social common capital. This means that it in turn is possible to yield 0</dpdw
when 12 > . Thus the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which basically centers on relative capital 
intensity ratio and relates the terms of trade and factor price ratio, does not necessarily hold in 
the model. 
Next, substituting (14) and (15) into (13), it can be obtained that 
 
 
,ˆ=ˆ
212
313
3 pee
eep



 (16) 
indicating that we have the second proposition: 
Proposition 2  Let import goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. An 
improvement in the terms of trade increases the price of non-tradable goods if and only if the 
congestion-relevance indices of both the non-tradable firm and the export firm are greater than, 
or both less than, that of the importe firm. That is: 
   3 3 1 2 1> 0 i f f s g n = s g n .
dp e e e e
dp
 
10 In Proposition 1 and in what follows as well, the notation "iff" is the abreviation of "if and only if" and it implies the equivalence of conditions 
or that one is both necessary and sufficient condition for the other. 
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where ei ≡ εi /βi can be called "congestion-relevance index" since large  ei , 
whether caused by large  εi   or small  βi (thus large income share of social 
common capital service), implies that firm  i  is highly relevant or contribu-
tory to congestion. It follows from (14) that  
Proposition 1   Let import goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. 
An improvement in the terms of trade reduces the degree of congestion if 
and only if the export firm has a smaller congestion-relevance index than the 
import firm.10 That is:
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indicating that we have the second proposition: 
Proposition 2  Let import goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. An 
improvement in the terms of trade increases the price of non-tradable goods if and only if the 
congestion-relevance indices of both the non-tradable firm and the export firm are greater than, 
or both less than, that of the importe firm. That is: 
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10 In Proposition 1 and in what follows as well, the notation "iff" is the abreviation of "if and only if" and it implies the equivalence of conditions 
or that one is both necessary and sufficient condition for the other. 
 Proposition 1 is intuitive and similar with the result of Asako (2009). 
Introducing non- radable goods seems to mak no difference here. Note that 
dw/dp < 0  if and nly if  e2 < e1, and note also that it is possible for  e2 < e1 
when α2 < α1,  where  αi  denot s the income share of social common capital. 
This me ns that it n turn is possible to yield  dw/dp < 0  when  α2 < α1. Thus
the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which basically centers on relative capi al 
intensity ratio and relates the terms of trade and factor price r ti , 
necessarily hold in the model.
 Next, substituting (14) and (15) into (13), it can be obtained that
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has a smaller congestion-rel vance index than th  import firm.10 That is:
2 1< 0 iff < .
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dp
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indicating that we have the second proposition: 
Proposition 2  Let import goods be the num raire and congestion tax fixed. An 
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dp e e e
dp
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10 In Proposition 1 and in what follows as well, the not tion "iff" is the abreviation of "if and only if" and it implies the equivalence of conditio s 
or that one is b th necessary and sufficient condition for he other. 
 
(16)
indicating that we have the second proposition:
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Proposition 2  Let import goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. An 
improvement in the terms of trade increases the price of non-tradable goods 
if and only if the congestion-relevance indices of both the non-tradable firm 
and the export firm are greater than, or both less than, that of the import firm. 
That is:
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where a hat operator "^" denotes a proportional change (e.g. 222 /=ˆ pdpp ) and the newly 
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where iiie  /  can be called "congestion-relevance index" since large ie , whether caused by 
large i  or small i  (thus large income share of social common capital service), implies that 
firm i  is highly relevant or contributory to congestion. It follows from (14) that   
Proposition 1  Let import goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. An 
improvement in the terms of trade reduces the degree of congestion if and only if the export firm 
has a smaller congestion-relevance index than the import firm.10 That is:
2 1< 0 iff < .
ds e e
dp
Proposition 1 is intuitive and similar with the result of Asako (2009). Introducing 
non-tradable goods seems to make no difference here. Note that 0</dpdw if and only if 
12 < ee , and note also that it is possible for 12 < ee  when 12 > ,  where i  denotes the 
income share of social common capital. This means that it in turn is possible to yield 0</dpdw
when 12 > . Thus the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which basically centers on relative capital 
intensity ratio and relates the terms of trade and factor price ratio, does not necessarily hold in 
the model. 
Next, substituting (14) and (15) into (13), it can be obtained that 
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indicating that we have the second proposition: 
Proposition 2  Let import goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. An 
improvement in the terms of trade increases the price of non-tradable goods if and only if the 
congestion-relevance indices of both the non-tradable firm and the export firm are greater than, 
or both less than, that of the importe firm. That is: 
   3 3 1 2 1> 0 i f f s g n = s g n .
dp e e e e
dp
 
10 In Proposition 1 and in what follows as well, the notation "iff" is the abreviation of "if and only if" and it implies the equivalence of conditions 
or that one is both necessary and sufficient condition for the other. 
      iff    sgn [e3 – e1] = sgn [e2 – e1]
where, the notation  sgn [e2 – e1] , for instance, means the sign of (e2 – e1).
2.2 Effects on Social Welfare
Does or doesn't an improvement in the terms of trade increase the social wel-
fare of a small country? To answer this question, calculate the total derivative 
of utility with respect to the terms of trade and obtain11
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Here, the notation  2 1sgn e e , for instance, means the sign of ( 2 1e e ).
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small country? To nswer this questi n, calculate the total derivative of utility with respect to the 
terms of trade and obtain11
.11=1
V
E
dp
dsU
X
Qp
Xdp
dU
V
h
iii 





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



(17) 
Next, define the marginal social cost of using social common capital service as 
.1
X
UQp
X
MSC ii





 

The first term in the right-hand side of above expression is the marginal damage to the gross 
output caused by the use of social common capital service. It measures the marginal social cost 
on the production side. The second term is exactly the value by which the household needs to 
increase consumption to compensate for the marginal loss of utility. This loss also comes from 
the use of social common capital services. The second term evaluates the marginal social cost on
the consumption side.  
Using the definitions of h  and i , we can rewrite the expression of MSC  into 
.11=



U
X
Qp
X
MSC hiii  (18) 
Then, substituting (18) into (17), we have 
  ,=1
V
E
dp
dsMSC
dp
dU
V


(19) 
which implies: 
Proposition 3  Let import goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. If an 
improvement in the terms of trade decreases the degree of congestion, then this improvement 
increases social welfare if and only if the congestion tax is low enough. If an improvement in the 
terms of trade increases the degree of congestion, then this improvement increases social 
welfare if and only if the congestion tax is high enough. Specifically, if 12 < ee , then 
> 0 i f f < .dU MSC B
dp
 
If on the contrary 12 > ee , then 
> 0 i f f > ,dU MSC B
dp
 
where 
 2 2 1 , (20)
pEB e e
X

 
11 See Appendix B for the details.
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11 See Appendix B for the details.
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wh ch implies:
Proposition 3  Let import g ods be the numeraire and congestion tax fi . 
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an improvement in the terms of trade decreases the degree of congestion, then 
this improvement increases social welfare if and only if the congestion tax is 
low enough. If an improvement in the terms of trade increases the degree of 
congestion, then this improvement increases social welfare if and only if the 
congestion tax is high enough. Specifically, if  e2 < e1 , then
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Here, the notation  2 1sgn e e , for instance, means the sign of ( 2 1e e ).
 
3.2  Effects on Social Welfare 
Does or doesn't an improvement in the terms of trade increase the social welfare of a 
small country? To answer this question, calculate the total derivative of utility with respect to the 
terms of trade and obtain11
.11=1
V
E
dp
dsU
X
Qp
Xdp
dU
V
h
iii 





 




(17) 
Next, define the marginal social cost of using social common capital service as 
.1
X
UQp
X
MSC ii





 

The first term in the right-hand side of above expression is the marginal damage to the gross 
output caused by the use of social common capital service. It measures the marginal social cost 
on the production side. The second term is exactly the value by which the household needs to 
increase consumption to compensate for the marginal loss of utility. This loss also comes from 
the use of social common capital services. The second term evaluates the marginal social cost on
the consumption side.  
Using the definitions of h  and i , we can rewrite the expression of MSC  into 
.11=



U
X
Qp
X
MSC hiii  (18) 
Then, substituting (18) into (17), we have 
  ,=1
V
E
dp
dsMSC
dp
dU
V


(19) 
which implies: 
Proposition 3  Let import goods be the nume air  and congestion tax fixed. If an 
improvement in the terms of trade d cr a es the d gre of congestion, then thi  improvement 
increases social lfare if and only if the congestion tax is low enough. If an improv ment in the 
terms of trade incr ases the degree of c ngestion, th n this improv ment increases social 
welfare if and only if the congest on tax is igh enough. Specifically, if 12 < ee , then 
> 0 i f f < .dU MSC B
dp
 
If on the contrary 12 > ee , then 
> 0 i f f > ,dU MSC B
dp
 
where 
 2 2 1 , (20)
pEB e e
X

 
11 See Appendix B for the details.
  0    iff    θ <  + |B|.
If on the contrary  e2 > e1 , then
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
The first term in the right-hand side of above expression is the marginal damage to the gross 
output caused by the use of social common capital service. It measures the marginal social cost 
on the production side. The second term is exactly the value by which the household needs to 
increase consumption to compensate for the marginal loss of utility. This loss also comes from 
the use of social common capital services. The second term evaluates the marginal social cost on
the consumption side.  
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
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Qp
X
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E
dp
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
(19) 
which implies: 
Proposition 3  Let import goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. If an 
improvement in the terms of trade decreases the degree of congestion, then this improvement 
increases social welfare if and only if the congestion tax is low enough. If an improvement in the 
terms of trade increases the degree of congestion, then this improvement increases social 
welfare if and only if the congestion tax is high enough. Specifically, if 12 < ee , then 
> 0 i f f < .dU MSC B
dp
 
If on the contrary 12 > ee , then 
> 0 i f f > ,dU MSC B
dp
 
where 
 2 2 1 , (20)
pEB e e
X

 
11 See Appendix B for the details.
  0    iff    θ >  – | |,
where
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(17) 
Next, define the marginal social cost of using social common capital service as 
.1
X
UQp
X
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




 

The first term in the right-hand side of above expression is the marginal damage to the gross 
output caused by the use of social common capital service. It measures the marginal social cost 
on the production side. The second term is exactly the value by which the household needs to 
increase consumption to compensate f r the marginal loss of utility. This loss also c mes f m 
the use of social common capital services. The second term evaluates the marginal social cost n
the consumption side.  
Using the definitions of h  and i , we ca  rewrite the expression f MSC  into 
.11=


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U
X
Qp
X
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Then, substituting (18) into (17), we have 
  ,=1
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(19) 
which implies: 
Proposition 3  Let import goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. If an 
improve ent in the terms of trade decreases the degree of congestion, then this improvement 
increases social welfare if and only if the congestion tax is low enough. If an improvement in the 
terms of t ade i creases the degree of cong s ion, then this improvem nt i creases soci l 
welfare if a d only if the c ngestion t x is hig  enough. Specifically, if 12 < ee , then 
> 0 i f f < .dU MSC B
dp
 
If on the contrary 12 > ee , then 
> 0 i f f > ,dU MSC B
dp
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 2 2 1 , (20)
pEB e e
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
 
11 See Appendix B for the details.
 
(20)
and  |B| > 0  denotes the absolute value of  B. 
Proof.  From (19),  dU/dp > 0 is equivalent to  (θ–MSC) ds/dp > –E/V. 
Therefore, if  e2 < e1, i.e.  ds/dp < 0 , then the inequality means  θ < MSC –
(E/V)dp/ds; if  e2 > e1, i.e.  ds/dp > 0, then the inequality means  θ > 
MSC – (E/V)dp/ds. Substituting (14) for  dp/ds  gives the claimed result.
 Q. E. D. 
 Proposition 3 has some policy implications: (i) if the export firm has a 
smaller congestion-relevance index than the import firm, when the terms of 
trade improves, a relatively low congestion tax may be appropriate; (ii) how-
ever, when the terms of trade deteriorate, a relatively high congestion tax may 
very well be better; (iii) if the export firm has a larger congestion-relevance 
index than the import firm, the policy should be taken in the opposite direc-
tion; and (iv) imposing congestion tax around  MSC  can ensure that, in spite 
of the congestion-relevance index, an improvement in the terms of trade will 
raise social welfare.
3. Operation in Congestion Tax
3.1 Effects on Congestion
Now suppose that a small operation in  θ, denoted by  dθ, occurs while the 
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terms of trade  p  remains unchanged, i.e.  dp = 0. From (4) and (6) , similarly 
with from (11) to (13) for  dθ = 0, we have  
 –ε1ŝ + β1ŵ = θˆ, (21)
 –ε2ŝ + β2ŵ = θˆ, (22)
 pˆ3 – ε3ŝ + β3ŵ = θˆ. (23)
where (21) and (22) can be used to solve for  ŝ  and  ŵ :   
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and 0>B  denotes the absolute value of B .  
Proof. From (19), 0>/dpdU  is equivalent to   VEdpdsMSC />/  . Therefore, if 
12 < ee , i.e. 0</dpds , then the inequality means < /MSC Edp Vds  ; if 12 > ee , i.e. 
0>/dpds , then the inequality means > /MSC Edp Vds  . Substituting (14) for dsdp/  gives 
the result.    
Proposition 3 has some policy implications: (i) if the export firm has larger 
congestion-relevance index than the import firm, when the terms of trade improves, a relatively 
low congestion tax may be appropriate; (ii) however, when the terms of trade deteriorate, a 
relatively high congestion tax may very well be better; (iii) if the export firm has smaller 
congestion-relevance index than the import firm, the policy should be taken in the opposite 
direction; and (iv) imposing congestion tax around MSC can ensure that, in spite of the 
congestion-relevance index, an improvement in the terms of trade will raise social welfare. 
4  Operation in Congestion Tax 
4.1  Effects on Congestion 
Now suppose that a small operation in  , denoted by d , occurs while the terms of 
trade p  remains unchanged, i.e. 0=dp . From (4) and (6) , similarly with from (11) to (13) for 
0=d , w  hav    
,ˆˆˆ 11  ws  (21) 
,ˆ=ˆˆ 22  ws  (22) 
,ˆ=ˆˆˆ 333  wsp  (23) 
where (21) and (22) can be used to solve for sˆ  and wˆ :    
 
,ˆ=ˆ
2112
12 


ee
s

 (24) 
 
.ˆ=ˆ
2112
12 


ee
w

 (25) 
Then, we obtain the fourth proposition that:
  
Proposition 4  Let import goods be the numeraire and the terms of trade unchanged. 
An increase in congestion tax reduces the congestion level if and only if the export firm is social 
common capital intensive and has a larger congestion-relevance index, or is private capital 
intensive and has a smaller congestion-relevance index. That is, 
   2 1 2 1< 0 i f f s g n = s g n .
ds e e
d
 

  
Note that an irregular case 0>/ dds  is possible in proposition 4 when 
sgn  =12   sgn  12 ee  , indicating that raising congestion tax does not necessarily reduce the 
degree of congestion under the small open economy setting. 
 
(24)
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trade p  remains unchanged, i.e. 0=dp . From (4) and (6) , similarly with from (11) to (13) for 
0=d , we have   
,ˆ=ˆˆ 11  ws  (21) 
,ˆ=ˆˆ 22  ws  (22) 
,ˆ=ˆˆˆ 333  wsp  (23) 
where (21) and (22) can be used to solve for sˆ  and wˆ :    
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Then, we obtain the fourth proposition that:
  
Propositio  4  Let import go ds be the numerair  and the t rms of trade unchanged. 
An increase in congestion tax reduces the congesti  level if and ly if the export firm is soc al 
common capital intensive and h s a large congestion-releva ce ind x, or is private capital 
intensive and has a smaller co gestion-relevance index. That is, 
   2 1 2 1< 0 i f f s g n = s g n .
ds e e
d
 

  
Note that an irregular case 0>/ ds  is possible in propositio  4 when 
sgn  =12   sgn  12 e , indicating that raising c ngestion tax do s ot necessarily reduce the 
degree of congestion under the small open economy setting. 
      iff    sgn [β2 – β1] = – sgn [e2 – e1].
Note that an irregular case  ds/dθ >0  is possible in Propo ition 4 wh n sgn 
[β2– β1] = sgn [ 2– e1], indicating that raising conge tion tax does n t n ces-
sarily redu e th  degree of congestio  under he small open economy 
setting.
3.2  Welfare Effects and the Optimal Congestion Tax
In this subsection, we are concerned with the influence of congestion tax on 
social welfare. As with (17) or through the process similar with Appendix B, 
we obtain
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     4.2  Welfare Effects and the Optimal Congestion Tax 
In this subsection, we are concerned with the influence of congestion tax on social 
welfare. As with (17) or through the process similar with Appendix B, we obtain
.=1



 d
ds
ds
d
V
EMSC
d
dU
V






 (26) 
Then, making use of (24) enables us to rewrite (26) into 
   ,=1


 d
dsAMSC
d
dU
V

where 
 
 
 2 1 1 2
2 1
 . 27
e e E
A
X
  
 

 

Note that 0>A  when 0</ dds , and 0<A  when 0>/ dds . Thus we obtain the fifth 
proposition that: 
Proposition 5  Let import goods be the numeraire and the terms of trade unchanged. If 
an increase in the congestion tax decreases the degree of congestion, then it improves social 
welfare if and only if congestion tax is low enough. If an increase in the congestion tax increases 
the degree of congestion, then it improves social welfare if and only if the congestion tax is high 
enough. Specifically, if sgn    =12  sgn  12 ee  , then 
> 0 i f f < .dU MSC A
d



If, on the other hand, sgn  =12   sgn  12 ee  , then 
> 0 i f f > ,dU MSC A
d



where 0>A denotes the absolute value of A .  
In the case 0</ dds , congestion tax 
= ( 2 8 )M S C A 
maximizes the utility or social welfare. Note that this optimal level of congestion tax   is 
greater than the optimal tax under autarky, which is the marginal social cost MSC to be given for 
E=0 and thereby A=0 and is written implicitly as in (18). However, in the irregular case 
0>/ dds , although   is an extremum point as well, it in fact is a local minimum point that 
locally minimizes the utility, thus is not the optimal congestion tax.  
5  Non-tradable Goods as the Numeraire 
5.1  Effects of the Change in the Terms of Trade 
So far, by choosing import good 1 as the numeraire, introducing non-tradable good 3
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maximizes the utility or social welfare. Note that this optimal level of congestion tax   is 
greater than the optimal tax under autarky, which is the marginal social cost MSC to be given for 
E=0 and thereby A=0 and is written implicitly as in (18). However, in the irregular case 
0>/ dds , although   is an extremum point as well, it in fact is a local minimum point that 
locally minimizes the utility, thus is not the optimal congestion tax.  
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So far, by choosing import good 1 as the numeraire, introducing non-tradable good 3
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β1 β2
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Note that  A > 0  when  ds/dθ < 0, and  A < 0 when  ds/dθ > 0. Thus we obtain 
the fifth proposition that:
Proposition 5  Let import goods be the numeraire and the terms of trade 
unchanged. If an increase in the congestion tax decreases the degree of con-
gestion, then it improves social welfare if and only if congestion tax is low 
enough. If an increase in the congestion tax increases the degree of conges-
tion, then it improves social welfare if and only if the congestion tax is high 
enough. Specifically, if sgn [β2 – β1] = –sgn [e2 – e1], then
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     4.2  Welfare Effects and the Optimal Congestion Tax 
In this subsection, we are concerned with the influence of congestion tax on social 
welfare. As with (17) or through the process similar with Appendix B, we obtain
.=1



 d
ds
ds
d
V
EMSC
d
dU
V






 (26) 
Then, making use of (24) enables us to rewrite (26) into 
   ,=1


 d
dsAMSC
d
dU
V

where 
 
 
 2 1 1 2
2 1
 . 27
e e E
A
X
  
 

 

Note that 0>A  when 0</ dds , and 0<A  when 0>/ dds . Thus we obtain the fifth 
proposition that: 
Proposition 5  Let import goods be the numeraire and the terms of trade unchanged. If 
an increase in the congestion tax decreases the degree of congestion, then it improves social 
welfare if and only if congestion tax is low enough. If an increase in the congestion tax increases 
the degree of congestion, then it improves social welfare if and only if the congestion tax is high 
enough. Specifically, if sgn    =12  sgn  12 ee  , then 
> 0 i f f < .dU MSC A
d



If, on the other hand, sgn  =12   sgn  12 ee  , then 
> 0 i f f > ,dU MSC A
d



where 0>A denotes the absolute value of A .  
In the case 0</ dds , congestion tax 
= ( 2 8 )M S C A 
maximizes the utility or social welfare. Note that this optimal level of congestion tax   is 
greater than the optimal tax under autarky, which is the marginal social cost MSC to be given for 
E=0 and thereby A=0 and is written implicitly as in (18). However, in the irregular case 
0>/ dds , although   is an extremum point as well, it in fact is a local minimum point that 
locally minimizes the utility, thus is not the optimal congestion tax.  
5  Non-tradable Goods as the Numeraire 
5.1  Effects of the Change in the Terms of Trade 
So far, by choosing import good 1 as the numeraire, introducing non-tradable good 3
      iff    θ <  + |A|.
If, on the other hand, sgn [β2 – β1] = sgn [e2 – e1], then
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Note that 0>A  when 0</ dds , and 0<A  when 0>/ dds . Thus we obtain the fifth 
proposition that: 
Propositio  5  Let i port goods be the numeraire and the terms of trade unchanged. If 
an increase i  the congestion t x decreases th  degree of congestion, then it improves social 
welfare if and only if congestion tax is o  enough. If an increase in th  c gestion tax increases 
the degree of c n estion, then it improves social welfare if and only if the congestion tax is high 
enough. Specifically, if sgn    =12  sgn  12 ee  , then 
> 0 i f f < .dU MSC A
d



If, on the other hand, sgn  =12   sgn  12 ee  , then 
> 0 i f f > ,dU MSC A
d



where 0>A denotes the absolute value of A .  
In the case 0</ dds , congestion tax 
= ( 2 8 )M S C A 
maximizes the utility or social welfare. Note that this optimal level of congestion tax   is 
greater than the optimal tax under autarky, which is the marginal social cost MSC to be given for 
E=0 and thereby A=0 and is written implicitly as in (18). However, in the irregular case 
0>/ dds , although   is an extremum point as well, it in fact is a local minimum point that 
locally minimizes the utility, thus is not the optimal congestion tax.  
5  Non-tradable Goods as the Numeraire 
5.1  Effects of the Change in the Terms of Trade 
So far, by choosing import good 1 as the numeraire, introducing non-tradable good 3
      iff    θ >  – |A|.
where  |A| > 0 denotes the absolute value of  A. 
 In the case  ds/dθ < 0, congestion tax
 θ* = MSC + |A| (28)
maximizes the utility or social welfare. Note that this optimal level of con-
gestion tax  θ* is greater than the optimal tax under autarky, which is the 
marginal social cost  MSC  to be given for  E = 0 and thereby  A = 0 and is 
written implicitly as in (18). However, in the irregular case  ds/dθ > 0, al-
though  θ* is an extremum point as well, it in fact is a local minimum point 
that locally minimizes the utility, thus is not the optimal congestion tax. 
4. Non-tradable Goods as the Numeraire
4.1  Effects of the Change in the Terms of Trade
So far, by choosing import good  1  as the numeraire, introducing non-trad-
able good  3  does not bring any significantly novel results compared with the 
model in Asako (2009). Here, we change the numeraire from good  1  to good 
3 , i.e. let  p3 ≡ 1, to see what difference it will bring about.
 Under the new numeraire setting, considering an improvement in the 
Kazumi Asako   Gang Li
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terms of trade  p ≡ p2/p1 with fixed congestion tax, equations from (11) to 
(13) are rewritten, respectively, to   
 pˆ1 – ε1ŝ + β1ŵ = 0, (29)
 pˆ2 – ε2ŝ + β2ŵ = 0, (30)
 – ε3ŝ + β3ŵ = 0. (31)
 Solving for  ŝ  and  ŵ  gives   
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does not bring any significantly novel results compared with the model in Asako (2009). Here, 
we change the numeraire from good 1 to good 3 , i.e. let 13 p , to see what difference it will 
bring about. 
Under the new numeraire setting, considering an improvement in the terms of trade 
12/ppp   with fixed congestion tax, equations from (11) to (13) are rewritten, respectively, to 
0,=ˆˆˆ 111 wsp   (29) 
0,=ˆˆˆ 222 wsp   (30) 
0.=ˆˆ 33 ws   (31) 
 Solving for sˆ  and wˆ gives    
   
,ˆ=ˆ
312312
3 ps



(32) 
   
.ˆ=ˆ
312312
3 pw



(33) 
 Now, corresponding to Proposition 1, we have   
Proposition 6 Let non-tradable goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. Then, 
we obtain 
   2 1 3 2 1 3< 0 i f f < 0 .
ds
dp
       
Similarly, the effect of an improvement in the terms of trade on social welfare can be 
readily obtained through (19), and the corresponding version of Proposition 3 is 
Proposition 7  Let non-tradable goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. If
    0,<312312  
then 
> 0 iff < .dU MSC B
dp
 
If, on the contrary, 
    0,>312312  
then 
> 0 iff > .dU MSC B
dp
 
Proposition 7 implies that, by changing the numeraire, non-tradable good 3  becomes 
crucial in determining the effects of the change in the terms of trade on the degree of congestion 
and social welfare. For instance, if good 3  has a value of 3  much greater than 3 , the 
degree of congestion is likely to decrease with a rise in the terms of trade. 
5.2  Effects of the Operation in Congestion Tax 
Now consider a small operation in congestion tax d  without altering the terms of 
 
(32)
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Similarly, the effect of an improvement in the terms of trade on social welfare can be 
readily obtained through (19), and the corresponding version of Proposition 3 is 
Proposition 7  Let non-tradable goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. If
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Proposition 7 implies that, by changing the numeraire, non-tradable good 3  becomes 
crucial in determining the effects of the change in the terms of trade on the degree of congestion 
and social welfare. For instance, if good 3  has a value of 3  much greater than 3 , the 
degree of congestion is likely to decrease with a rise in the terms of trade. 
5.2  Effects of the Operation in Congestion Tax 
Now consider a small operation in congestion tax d  without altering the terms of 
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Now, correspondi g to Proposition 1, we have  
Proposition 6  Let non-tradable goods be the numeraire and congestion tax 
fixed. Then, we obtain
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does not bring any significantly novel results c mpa d with the model in Asako (2009). Here, 
we change the numeraire from good 1 t  good 3 , i.e. let 13 p , to see what differ nce it will 
bring about. 
Under the new numeraire setting, consid ring an improveme t in the terms of trade 
12/ppp   with fixed congestion tax, equati s from (11) to (13) are rewritten, resp ctively, to 
0,=ˆˆˆ 111 wsp   (29) 
0,=ˆˆˆ 222 wsp   (30) 
0.=ˆˆ 33 ws   (31) 
 Solving for sˆ  and wˆ gives   
   
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

(32) 
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3 pw


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(33) 
 Now, corresponding to Propositi n 1, we have  
Propositi n 6 Let no -trad ble g ods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. Then, 
we obtain 
  2 1 3 2 1 3< 0 i f f < 0 .
ds
dp
      
Similarly, the effect of an improveme t in the terms of trade on social w lfare can be 
readily obtained through (19), and the corresponding ve sion of Proposition 3 is 
Proposition 7  Let non-tradable g ods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. If
    0,<312312  
then 
> 0 iff < .dU MSC B
dp
 
If, on the contrary, 
    0,>312312  
then 
> 0 iff > .dU MSC B
dp
 
Proposition 7 im lies that, by changing the numeraire, no -trad ble g od 3  ecomes 
crucial in determining th  effects of change in t  terms of trade on the degree f cong stion 
and social welfare. For instance, if good 3  has a value of 3 much greater than 3 , the 
degree of cong stion is likely to decreas  with a rise in the terms of trade. 
5.2  Effects of the Operation in Congestion Tax 
Now consider a small operation in congestion tax d  without altering the terms of 
 <     iff    (ε2 – ε1) β3 –  (β2 – β1) ε3 < .
 Similarly, the effect of an improvement in the terms of trade on social 
welfare can be readily obtained through (19), and he corr sponding version 
of Prop sition 3 is
Prop sition 7  Let on-tr dable goods be the numeraire and congestion tax 
fixed. If
 (ε2 – ε1) β3 – (β2 – β1) ε3 < 0,
then
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does not bring any significantly novel results co pared with the model in Asako (2009). Here, 
we change the numeraire from good 1 to good 3 , i.e. let 13 p , to see what difference it will 
bring about. 
Under the new numeraire setting, considering an improvement in the terms of trade 
12/ppp   with fixed congestion tax, equations from (11) to (13) are rewritten, respectively, to 
0,=ˆˆˆ 111 wsp   (29) 
0,=ˆˆˆ 222 wsp   (30) 
0.=ˆˆ 33 ws   (31) 
 Solving for sˆ  and wˆ gives    
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,ˆ=ˆ
312312
3 ps



(32) 
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312312
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

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 Now, corresponding to Proposition 1, we have   
Proposition 6 Let on-tradable goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. Then, 
we obtain 
   2 1 3 2 1 3< 0 i f f < 0 .
ds
dp
       
Similarly, th effect f an improv ment in the terms of trade n ocial welfare can be 
readily obtained through (19), and the corresponding version of Proposition 3 is 
Proposition 7  Let non-tradable goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. If
    0,<312312  
then 
> 0 iff < .dU MSC B
dp
 
If, on the contrary, 
    0,>312312  
then 
> 0 iff > .dU MSC B
dp
 
Proposition 7 mpl es that, by changing th num rai e, no - radable g od 3  becomes 
crucial in determining the effects of the change in the terms of trade on the degree of congestion 
and social welfare. For instance, if good 3  has a value of 3  much greater than 3 , the 
degree of congestion is likely to decrease with a rise in the terms of trade. 
5.2  Effects of the Operation in Congestion Tax 
Now consider a small operation in congestion tax d  without altering the terms of 
      iff    θ   + | |.
If, on the contrary,
 (ε2 – ε1) β3 – (β2 – β1) ε3 > 0,
then
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does not bring any significantly novel results compared with the model in Asako (2009). Here, 
we change the numeraire from good 1 to good 3 , i.e. let 13 p , to see what difference it will 
bring about. 
Under the new numeraire setting, considering an improvement in the terms of trade 
12/ppp   with fixed congestion tax, equations from (11) to (13) are rewritten, respectively, to 
0,=ˆˆ 111 wsp   29
0,=ˆˆˆ 222 wsp   (30) 
0.=ˆˆ 33 ws   1
 Solving for sˆ  and wˆ gives    
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

(32) 
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 Now, corresponding to Proposition 1, we h ve   
Proposition 6 Let non-tradable goods be the numeraire an  co gestion tax fix d. Then, 
we obtain 
   2 1 3 2 1 3< 0 i f f < 0 .
ds
dp
       
Similarly, the effect of an improvement in the terms of trade on social welfare can be 
readily obtained through (19), and the corresponding version of Proposition 3 is 
Proposition 7  Let non-tradable goods be the numeraire and congestion tax fixed. If
    0,<312312  
then 
> 0 iff < .dU MSC B
dp
 
If, on the contrary, 
    0,>312312  
then 
> 0 iff > .dU MSC B
dp
 
Proposition 7 implies that, by changing the numeraire, non-tradable good 3  becomes 
crucial in determining the effects of the change in the terms of trade on the degree of congestion 
and social welfare. For instance, if good 3  has a value of 3  much greater than 3 , the 
degree of congestion is likely to decrease with a rise in the terms of trade. 
5.2  Effects of the Operation in Congestion Tax 
Now consider a small operation in congestion tax d  without altering the terms of 
      iff    θ >  – | |.
 Proposition 7 implies that, by changing the numeraire, non-tradable good 
3  becomes crucial in determining the effects of the change in the terms of 
trade on the deg ee of congestion and social welfare. For instance, if good  3 
h s a value of  ε3  much g eater than β3, the egree of congestion is likely to 
decreas  with a rise in the terms f trad .
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4.2 Effects of the Operation in Congestion Tax
Now consider a small operation in congestion tax  dθ  without altering the 
terms of trade, i.e.  dp = 0. In this setting, equations (21)-(23) are replaced by
 pˆ1 – ε1ŝ + β1ŵ = θˆ, (34)
 pˆ2 – ε2ŝ + β2ŵ = θˆ, (35)
 – ε3ŝ + β3ŵ = θˆ. (36)
The solutions can be expressed as 
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trade, , i.e. 0=dp . In this setting, equations (21)-(23) are replaced by 
,ˆ=ˆˆˆ 111  wsp  (34) 
,ˆ=ˆˆˆ 222  wsp  (35) 
.ˆ=ˆˆ 33  ws  (36) 
 The solutions can be expressed as  
   
,ˆ=ˆ
123123
12 



s
   
.ˆ=ˆ
123123
12 



w
 Therefore, the corresponding versions of Propositions 4 and 5 should be replaced by: 
Proposition 8 Let non-tradable goods be the numeraire and the terms of trade 
unchanged. Then, we obtain 
     2 1 2 1 3 2 1 3< 0 iff sgn = sgn .
ds
d
       

      
Proposition 9 Let non-tradable good be the numeraire and the terms of trade 
unchanged. If
     2 1 2 1 3 2 1 3sgn = sgn              ,
then 
> 0 iff < .dU MSC A
d



And if 
     2 1 2 1 3 2 1 3sgn = sgn ,            
then 
> 0 iff > .dU MSC A
d



By changing the numeraire, the non-tradable good now becomes crucial to the effects of 
operating congestion tax. However, in the case of 0</ dds , the optimal congestion tax that 
maximizes social welfare equals 
AMSC  =
which is the same as that obtained in (28) with (27) for A  with good 1 set as the numeraire. 
The irrelevance property of the numaire good to the optimal level of congestion tax stems from 
the fact that    is determined first as a result of policy operation, and the real economy adjusts 
to that endogenously with the remaining degree of freedom  
6  Concluding Remarks 
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 By changing the numeraire, the non-tradable good now becomes crucial 
to the effects of operating congestion tax. However, in the case of  ds/dθ < 0, 
the optimal congestion tax that maximizes social welfare equals
 θ* = MSC + |A|
which is the sam  as that obtained in (28) with (27) for  |A|  with good  1 
set s the numeraire. The irrelevance property of the numeraire good to the 
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optimal level of congestion tax stems from the fact that  θ* is determined first 
as a result of policy operation, and the real economy adjusts to that endoge-
nously with the remaining degree of freedom. 
Concluding Remarks
By introducing non-tradable goods, this paper discusses how the degree of 
congestion, the price of non-tradable goods and social welfare are affected by 
an improvement in the terms of trade, as well as by an operation in congestion 
tax. The main results are concluded as Propositions 1 to 5. We find that the 
presence of non-tradable goods has little influence on these results when the 
numeraire is the import good.
 However, when the numeraire is changed to the non-tradable goods, the 
results of comparative statics change considerably in that, for example, the 
income share of social common capital and the sensitivity over the degree of 
congestion become different from those obtained under the case of the import 
good numeraire. The detailed alterations are summarized as Propositions 6 to 
9.
 Why does the setting of the numeraire matter? This is because in the 
model the price variables are not all determined endogenously, since con-
gestion tax  θ  to begin with is an exogenously determined policy parameter. 
Thus, different numeraire settings mean different real levels of congestion 
tax in terms of the numeraire good, which in turn implies that relative prices 
do matter beyond the proportional scale effects. When a certain good is used 
as the numeraire, congestion tax has to be measured in the unit of that good, 
and setting different numeraires will yield different policy effects, depending 
on the properties of the numeraire goods. Therefore, choice of an appropriate 
price numeraire, if possible, can be seen as another policy-making tool.
 The stock of private capital and social common capital are fixed in this 
paper. It is quite likely that new results and implications would result if this 
model were to be extended to long-term and dynamic cases. This would be an 
interesting topic for future research.
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.ii   
l i   i/   /  t  l  t  i   /  i  t i   t 
.    , ,   t  i iti   h   i  t  t i  
i i i i i
i
i i
d d
dp
i i
i i i
i i i
,i i iX
 
  tit ti  d    i l  . 
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Appendix B 
Taking the total derivative of  sXCCCU h;,,, 321  with respect to p  gives 
.=
dp
ds
s
U
dp
dXU
dp
dCU
dp
dU h
h
i
i


 (B1) 
 From equations (3) , (5), and (7)-(9), it can be rewritten into 
31 2
1 2 3= h
dQ dXdQ dQdU dE dE U dsp E p p p
d dp d dp d dp dp s dp
   
    
         
   
= .i hi
dQ dX U dsp E
dp dp s dp
 
  
   
 
 (B2) 
Solving for dpdQi/  and dpdX h/  to analyze the sign of dpdU/  is tedious and not 
necessary. We can use (4), (6) , (10) and the d finition of h   i  to obtai  
1 1= i i i i i hi
i i
Q Q dX Q dK dXdU ds U dsp E
dp s dp X dp K dp dp s dp

 
    
     
    

 1 1= h i i hi i i
d X X d K Uds dsp Q r E
s dp dp dp s dp

 


    
 

1 1= hi i i
Uds dX dK dsp Q r E
s dp dp dp s dp

 

    
1 1= ,hi i i
UdsV p Q E
dp X X

 

 
   
 
 (B3) 
 and substituting VdsdX =  and 0=dK  yields (17). 
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Taking the total derivative of  sXh;,,, 321  ith respect to p  gives 
.=
dp
ds
sdp
dX
dp
d
dp
d h
h
i
i


 ( 1) 
 Fro  equations (3) , (5), and (7)-(9), it can be re ritten into 
31 2
1 2 3= h
d dXd dd dE dE dsp E p p p
d dp d dp d dp dp s dp
   
    
         
   
= .i hi
d dX dsp E
dp dp s dp
 
  
   
 
( 2) 
Solving for dpd i/  and dpdX h/  to analyze the sign of dpd /  is tedious and not 
necessary. e can use (4), (6) , (10) and the d finition of h   i  to obtai  
1 1= i i i i i hi
i i
dX d dXd ds dsp E
dp s dp X dp dp dp s dp

 
    
     
    
 1 1= h i i hi i i
d X X dds dsp r E
s dp dp dp s dp

 


    
1 1= hi i i
ds dX d dsp r E
s dp dp dp s dp

 

    
1 1= ,hi i i
dsV p E
dp X X

 

 
   
 
( 3) 
 and substituting VdsdX =  and 0=d  yields (17). 
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dp dp s dp
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  
   
 
 (B2) 
Solving for dpdQi/  and dpdX h/  to analyze the sign of dpdU/  is tedious and not 
necessary. We can use (4), (6) , (10) and the definition of h  and i  to obtain 
1 1= i i i i i hi
i i
Q Q dX Q dK dXdU ds U dsp E
dp s dp X dp K dp dp s dp

 
    
     
   

 1 1= h i i hi i i
d X X d K Uds dsp Q r E
s dp dp dp s dp

 


    
 

1 1= hi i i
Uds dX dK dsp Q r E
s dp dp dp s dp

 

    
1 1= ,hi i i
UdsV p Q E
dp X X

 

 
   
 
 (B3) 
 and substituting VdsdX =  and 0=dK  yields (17). 
  
 
(B3)
and substituting  X = Vds  and  dK = 0 yields (17).
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Notes
1.  The first author would like to thank JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research 
(C), grant number 17K03724, the Kikawada Foundation, and Economic Research 
Institute, Faculty of Economics, Rissho University for their research support.
2.  Faculty of Economics, Rissho University (kasako@ris.ac.jp.)
3.  Faculty of Economics, Toyo University
4.  Later, Uzawa (2005) shifts to prefer the term “social common capital” over 
“social overhead capital.” 
5.  This setting can be readily extended to the case of  n  non-tradable goods, and 
the main results still remain.
6.  Smaller  gi(s)  implies greater damage on firm  i  and vice versa.
7.  See Edwards (1990) for some other types of congestion.
8.  We do not explicitly solve for  λ  as the mere knowlege that  λ > 0 is sufficient 
to obtain the propositions of this paper.
9.  Refer to Appendix A for the detailed analytical derivations.
10.  In Proposition 1 and in what follows as well, the notation “iff” is the abreviation 
of “if and only if” and it implies the equivalence of conditions or that one is both 
necessary and sufficient condition for the other.
11.  See Appendix B for the details.
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